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In Defence of Hume’s Historical Method1 
Alix Cohen 
 
A tradition among certain Hume scholars, best known as the ‘New Humeans’, proposes a 
novel reading of Hume’s work, and in particular of his conception of causality.2 The purpose 
of this paper is to conduct a similar move regarding Hume’s historical method. It is similar for 
two reasons: firstly, it is intended to reintegrate Hume’s theory into present-day debates on the 
nature of history; and secondly, the reading I propose is directed against the standard 
interpretation of Hume’s history. This interpretation claims that in spite of being a historian, 
Hume misunderstands the nature of both historical knowledge and the historical enterprise. In 
other words, the Humean methodology would be incompatible with a genuine historical 
practice. This censure is based upon three particular criticisms:  
 
(1) The criticism of ahistoricalism: Hume believes human nature is an unchangeable 
substratum, and thus cannot account for historical change.  
(2) The criticism of parochialism: Hume is trapped in his own historical province3, 
and thus understands other times in the light of his own.  
(3) The criticism of moral condescension: Hume presumes the same standard is 
applicable throughout history, and thus judges the past according to his own moral 
standard.  
 
I shall argue that these criticisms are the result of a misunderstanding of what Hume means to 
accomplish through his investigation of history and that moreover, he is aware of these 
pitfalls.  
Hume’s theory faces a difficulty essential to any philosophical analysis of history. History 
is no doubt the narrative of changes in the past. But if men are perpetually subject to change 
through history, how can the historian hope to understand and account for their behaviour? In 
other words, if there is no constancy of human nature, is he not condemned either to have a 
parochial knowledge of history (i.e. understand it in his own terms), or to view different 
historical times as alien (i.e. be unable to make sense of them)? But if he presupposes a 
minimal constancy of human nature, a constancy that is sufficient to secure the possibility of 
his understanding of other times, is he not missing the very nature of history in ruling out a 
priori fundamental historical differences?  
I hold that Hume’s historical method handles this difficulty insofar as any historian can. 
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To support my claim, I will show why the three main criticisms of Hume’s theory are 
unfounded. In the first section, I examine the criticism of ahistoricalism and suggest that 
Hume’s twofold theory of human nature is the means to rebut it: he holds, on the one hand, 
that human nature is uniform enough to allow historical understanding, but, on the other hand, 
that the influence of the context on the social nature of man leaves sufficient room to account 
for historical change. I then consider the criticism of parochialism and show that the key to 
the problem relies on the principle of sympathy: it should be understood as the condition of 
possibility of historical knowledge, for it makes historical understanding possible and sets up 
its limits. Finally, I look into the criticism of moral condescension and argue that Hume’s 
theory cannot be charged with it. To support my claim, I draw a parallel between Hume’s 
theory of historical interpretation and contemporary theories of the principle of charity.  
 
1. Ahistoricalism 
 
Some commentators criticise Hume’s theory of history for being fundamentally – and 
paradoxically – ahistorical. For instance, Fischer argues that Hume’s history “constitutes a 
fallacy”, the fallacy of the universal man, which assumes that a people or individuals are 
intellectually and psychologically the same in all times, places and circumstances.4 Similarly, 
Stern claims that “Hume maintained the thesis of an invariable human nature”.5 Finally, 
Black agrees when he writes: “Hume sees only similarities”; he “did not grasp the elements of 
the problem [of historical explanation], because he was dominated […] by the belief that 
human nature was uniformly the same at all times and places”.6  
These commentators’ conviction that Hume believes human nature is uniform and 
immutable leads them to conclude that his theory of history is ahistorical. Their interpretation 
is supported by the much quoted passages of the Treatise and the Enquiries where Hume 
claims that there is a great uniformity amongst men. The most famous is probably the 
following:  
 
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, 
in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and 
operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: the same events follow 
from the same causes [….] Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that 
history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular (Enquiry, 83).7  
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Taken literally, this quote seems to suggest that Hume does believe in a uniformity of human 
nature. But if it is the case, how are we to understand the numerous quotes from the Essays 
which imply the contrary?8 I shall argue that the criticism of ahistoricalism is based on a 
misunderstanding of Hume’s historical method.9 To support my claim, I will try to reconcile 
the ‘uniformity passages’ and the ‘diversity passages’, and show how Hume can hold a 
‘historical theory of history’ without being inconsistent with his theory of human nature.  
At the root of these commentators’ misunderstanding is Hume’s attempt to accommodate 
two apparently contradictory requirements:  
 
(a) Human nature should not be immutable, to allow the possibility of historical 
change.  
(b) Human nature must be in some way uniform, to allow the possibility of 
understanding by historians.  
 
The key to the relationship between the uniformity and the diversity of human nature is to 
place the uniformity passages mentioned above in their proper context. They occur as part of 
the argument that human beings, like other parts of nature, are governed by causal laws. 10  
 
Where would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain or 
determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant 
operation on actions? […] It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or 
action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this [includes] 
inference from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct (Enquiry, 89-90). 
 
But the necessity of these laws – which are derived from historical experience in a wide 
sense – is always inferred. Because of its empirical origin, it is subject to variation. In other 
words, the constancy of human nature in history is open to the influence of context: “Man is 
a very variable being, and susceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of 
conduct. What may be true, while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found false, 
when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions”.11 The causes that constitute 
the influence of circumstances, and thus explain these differences, are what Hume calls 
“moral causes”.  
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By moral causes, I mean all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives 
or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are, the 
nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which 
people live, the situation of the nation with regards to its neighbours, and such like 
circumstances (Of National Character, 198).  
 
Thus, the principles of human nature are similar to the principle of gravity; and the 
particular circumstances in which each society finds itself are comparable to the “inclinations 
of the ground”.12 For instance, culture deeply influences which qualities are found to be 
useful or agreeable, and so culture, rather than nature, determines the qualities that a people 
will find of merit.13  
 
We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such 
a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same 
manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and 
opinions (Enquiry, 85).  
 
This point, far from being anecdotal, has been historically very influential, notably on Adam 
Smith: “The different situations of different ages and countries are apt, in the same manner, to 
give different characters to the generality of those who live in them, and their sentiments 
concerning the particular degree of each quality that is either blameable or praiseworthy vary, 
according to that degree which is usual in their country, and in their own times”.14 If the 
moral sentiments of the individual are the expression of the general sentiments of the society 
of which he is a member, it is to be expected that moral standards will vary according to the 
conditions of the different societies in which they arise. Similarly, knowledge is an essentially 
social phenomenon, requiring the participation of others from whom one learns, and from 
whom one requires endorsement. Our beliefs are anchored in acquired customs, learned 
practices and conventions, and inherited traditions: “all human institutions […] are in 
continual fluctuation”;15 “every being, however seemingly firm, is in continual flux, and 
change”.16  
Therefore, far from claiming human nature is substantial (i.e. not subject to change), 
Hume merely accounts for the possibility of causal inference for human behaviour while 
leaving room for historical change. Contrary to the interpretations of Fischer, Stern and Black, 
the passages regarding the uniformity of human nature do not show that Hume believes, 
implicitly or explicitly, in a constancy of human nature which entails that history simply 
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repeats itself. Constancy of human nature is a principle that makes the science of man, and 
history in particular, possible. Hence, the key to resolving Hume’s alleged ahistoricalism is to 
distinguish between minimal constancy and substantial uniformity. As I have shown, the 
former, unlike the latter, allows a wide range of political, social, moral and cultural 
differences.  
However, Hume’s response to the criticism of ahistoricalism leads to a second type of 
difficulty. If Hume’s theory makes room for historical change, how can the Humean historian 
reach and understand concrete historical differences? In other words, how can Hume’s theory 
allow the historian to escape from his own historical province? I shall examine this issue in 
the context of the criticism of parochialism.  
 
2. Parochialism 
 
The second criticism commonly directed at Hume’s theory of history, the criticism of 
parochialism, is that Hume unwarily understands – or one should say misunderstands – other 
times in the light of his own time. This claim is based on the belief that his theory of human 
nature does not allow him to relate to different times and values, and thus confines him to a 
vision of man modelled on the eighteenth century Scottish gentleman. For instance, 
Collingwood claims that “no one in his time had done enough work on the history of thought 
to know that both the science and the experience of an eighteenth century European were 
highly peculiar historical facts, very different from those of other peoples and other times. 
Nor was it yet realized that, even apart from the evidence of history, men must have thought 
in very different ways when as yet they were hardly emerged from the ape”.17  
Peter Jones, in his paper Hume on Context, Sentiment and Testimony, sets the pitfall of 
parochialism back in the context of the debate set by d’Alembert: one does not know a 
country simply by owning a map of it; one must undertake the journey oneself.18 The issue of 
historical shifts of meaning and beliefs is thus central to seventeenth and eighteenth century 
debates, in particular in theology, and occasions numerous problems for historians. As Jones 
makes clear, with no intervening medium across separate points of time, they cannot rely on 
an unchanging content beneath linguistic variation, and may be unable to work out what was 
being said at a particular time.19  
Moreover, historians have access to information denied to the agent before the event – 
namely, the actual outcome, the long-term consequences, and the changing significance that 
may be assigned over time to what happened – and it can lead them to misinterpret or 
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misunderstand the occurrence of an event by over-intellectualising an agent’s behaviour. 
However, against this tendency, prominent in thinkers such as Adam Smith or William 
Robertson, Hume advocates that historians should not ascribe intentions and motives to an 
agent of which the agent is unaware.20 Consequently, contrary to Collingwood, I shall argue 
that Hume is concerned with the risk of parochialism and that, moreover, he is not guilty of it. 
I will show that for the Humean historian, the principle of sympathy is the means to escape 
from his own particular historical province and bridge the gap between the perspective of the 
agent and that of the spectator.  
I believe that in order to overcome historical shifts in meaning and beliefs, historical 
practice requires a ‘shift of the self’ allowed in Hume’s theory by the principle of sympathy. 
It is in this sense that sympathy should be understood as the condition of possibility of 
historical knowledge. By its means, the historian can both escape from his historical province 
and reach different ones. Firstly, it eliminates the partiality of a spectator in enabling him to 
get away from his idiosyncratic point of view. Applied to history, it ensures the historian can 
escape from his own historical province, and thus eliminates his partiality. Secondly and 
conversely, sympathy ensures participation in the pleasure and pain of people whose 
situations are remote and indifferent to us. In other words, it transforms an indifferent 
spectator into an involved and concerned one. Applied to history, it allows the historian to 
‘become part of’ historical events.21  
Hence, the two functions of the principle of sympathy operate a ‘decentralisation’ of the 
self and its primitive point of view: both from partiality to impartiality, and from indifference 
to concern. This shift plays a fundamental role in the historical method; it allows the historian 
to be part of distant historical events without being partial. Consequently, the common 
feature of sympathy’s functions is that it is a principle of communication.  
 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable […] than that propensity we have to 
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own (Treatise, 316; my emphasis). 
 
Sympathy allows the communication of the feelings of agents belonging to other times and 
places in getting over the distance between the historian and his object through the addition of 
a psychological dimension. It leads him to feel other’s passions, sentiments and even 
opinions: “This is the nature and cause of sympathy, and ‘tis after this manner we enter so 
deep into the opinions and affections of others”.22 But as with any type of communication, 
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communication by means of sympathy is mediated. We can only apprehend others’ states of 
mind through signs, and in the historian’s case, through the narration of their actions.  
 
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those 
external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. […] However 
instantaneous this change of the idea into the impression may be, it proceeds from certain 
views and reflections which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher (Treatise, 317; 
my emphasis).  
 
Sympathy puts us on the track of recovering the motives, intentions and reasons which inform 
agents’ actions. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to reach them. As Hume’s reference to the 
notion of ‘sign’ implies, the historian is compelled to use actions as signs of the agent’s 
motives and reasons since they are not immediately available to him. Thus, the only way to 
reach intentions is through causal inferences from actions to motives, as is the case in moral 
judgements.23 These inferences can be seen as pieces of moral reasoning: to understand a 
moral cause is to have an internal grasp of an agent’s action, working through practical 
reasoning the conclusion of which is the idea of the action. In this sense, Hume’s historical 
method can be understood as a hermeneutic approach to historical data.24 
Therefore, contrary to Collingwood’s claim, Hume’s history is far from being parochial. 
However, Hume’s response to the criticism of parochialism leaves out a correlated issue, 
namely the issue of moral condescension. I have shown that it is through the means of 
sympathy that he can escape from his own historical province. In this sense, sympathy is the 
condition of possibility of historical understanding: it allows the Humean historian to reach 
different times and values, and thus he cannot be held accountable for understanding other 
times in the light of his own.25 Yet, the fact that sympathy is the means to reach other times 
and places does not preclude Hume from judging them according to his own moral standard.  
 
3.   Moral condescension   
 
The criticism of moral condescension can be understood as a moral version of the criticism of 
parochialism. It argues that Hume judges the values of other times with a standard of his own 
time. For instance, Greig claims that Hume “judged the past as if it were the present [and] 
took for granted that the same standard must be apt to past centuries as well”.26 Contrary to 
this charge, I would like to suggest that far from being morally condescending, Hume views 
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different ages from the inside and tries to show how customs that appear barbarous to us make 
sense after all. To support my claim, I will argue that Hume’s conception of historical 
explanation is underpinned by the belief that people’s behaviour, attitudes and values make 
sense for themselves. In other words, Hume presupposes a certain form of ‘rationality’ behind 
agents’ conduct. 27  
First of all, a passage from Hume’s History of England provides evidence of his 
awareness of the pitfall of moral condescension: “it seems unreasonable to judge of the 
measures, embraced during one period, by the maxims, which prevail in another”.28 The 
fundamental premise underlying this affirmation is that the various maxims which belong to 
different times have a raison d’être. Following Hume’s endeavour, other Scottish historians, 
and William Robertson in particular, address this issue by assessing every event and historical 
character “by the principles and maxims of their own age, not by those of another”.29 In this 
sense, for Robertson as for Hume, to be faithful and impartial, historians need not write only 
contemporary history.  
To have a better grasp of Hume’s specific point, I would like to relate his theory of 
historical interpretation to contemporary theories of the principle of charity.30 The linguistic 
and logical dimensions put aside, I believe Hume and Davidson, Quine or Putnam have a 
similar concern for agents’ rationality. They share a view of the principle of charity as the 
condition of possibility of interpretation in the sense that they both presuppose there is 
something in common between us and the people we interpret. Contemporary theorists 
understand this common feature in terms of rationality, whilst I believe Hume would rather 
formulate it in terms of a common humanity of which rationality is just one component, 
passions and sentiments being the main elements at play. And this presupposition is 
legitimated by a deficit of empirical data – a deficit that is common to the philosopher and the 
historian, as the following quote exemplifies: 
 
Most historians are inclined to blame his choice [Oliver Cromwell’s rejection of the crown]; 
but he must be allowed the best judge of his own situation […] And in such complicated 
subjects, the alteration of a very minute circumstance, unknown to the spectator, will often be 
sufficient to cast the balance, and render a determination, which, in itself, may be uneligible, 
very prudent, or even absolutely necessary to the actor (History of England, VI, 97; my 
emphasis).  
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Since he does not, and cannot, know everything about the agent’s situation, Hume is lead to 
presuppose that given the circumstances, the agent’s choices must have made sense for 
himself.31 The best example of the application of the Humean form of the principle of charity 
can be found in A Dialogue.  
In A Dialogue, Hume examines some social practices that appear particularly alien to 
modern spectators, practices such as “the Greek loves”, “the marriage of half-brothers and 
sisters”, and French gallantry.32 He wants to show that the external description of any practice 
is bound to make it look incomprehensible or immoral: “There are no manners so innocent or 
reasonable, but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if measured by a standard, unknown to 
the persons”.33 Conversely, Hume’s historical method consists in tracing back the causes of 
the emergence of these ‘alien’ customs. For instance,  
 
The Greek loves arose from a very innocent cause, the frequency of the gymnastic exercises 
among that people; and were recommended, though absurdly, as the source of friendship, 
sympathy, mutual attachment, and fidelity; qualities esteemed in all nations and all ages (A 
Dialogue, 334). 
 
Hume can make sense of the “Greek loves” by ‘putting himself in their shoes’, and thus 
giving a causal account of their occurrence. This account takes into consideration both the 
influence of the context (here the frequency of gymnastic) and the principles of human nature 
(here friendship). Hence, I would like to suggest that the implicit assumption of A Dialogue is 
that we can understand and account for actions and values that look barbarous or alien at first 
sight by showing that they are motivated by reasons which can make sense, even for us. 
Guided by the principle of charity, the work of the historian consists in recovering these 
reasons through moral reasoning and sympathy.34 
Surely, there are disparities between the contemporary understanding of the principle of 
charity and the minimal rationality presupposed by Hume. Firstly, far from building its 
conception of rationality on logical consistency, the Humean concept of rationality is based 
on what has been called ‘the impious maxim of the ancients’, that is to say the belief that 
agents are motivated by a concern for their own good.35 Secondly, and more importantly for 
our focus, a fundamental difference between Hume and his ‘charitable’ descendants is that 
Hume’s principle of charity has a wider scope: it is charitable to reasonings Hume himself 
does not endorse. By means of sympathy, he can mirror the mechanisms leading to people’s 
beliefs and behaviour, no matter how cranky or flawed they are. In this sense, the Humean 
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slogan could be ‘understanding without endorsing’36. Hence, it differs from the Davidsonian 
principle of charity, a principle that has been seen as too standardised and limited to be 
genuinely charitable.37  
Therefore, the comparison between Hume and contemporary theories of the principle of 
charity supplements our understanding of Hume’s historical method in underlining one of its 
fundamental characteristics: far from being morally condescending, it is primarily charitable 
towards historical agents. Hence, the fundamental role of the principle of sympathy in Hume’s 
philosophy should not only be understood as a means to account for the communication of 
opinions and emotions. It is also – and perhaps more importantly – a certain outlook on 
human nature and social interaction that is underpinned by the belief that people’s behaviour 
and values, no matter how different from ours, make sense.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The intention of this essay was to rehabilitate Hume’s theory of history and more particularly, 
to defend Hume’s historical method against three criticisms. In the first section, I argued 
against the criticism of ahistoricalism that Hume’s theory of human nature is subtle enough to 
allow a distinction between minimal constancy and substantial uniformity: the former, 
contrary to the latter, allows a wide range of political, social, moral and cultural differences. I 
then turned to the criticism of parochialism and showed how the principle of sympathy allows 
the Humean historian to escape from his own historical province and reach other times and 
places. In this sense, I suggested that sympathy should be understood as the condition of 
possibility for historical knowledge. Finally, I considered the criticism of moral 
condescension and drew a parallel between Hume’s method and contemporary uses of the 
principle of charity in order to show that far from being condescending, Hume’s approach to 
historical explanation is genuinely charitable.  
As indicated in the introduction, my rehabilitation of Hume’s historical method has been 
inspired by the move operated by the ‘New Humeans’ regarding Hume’s philosophy of 
science. In this sense, I believe the reading I have put forward can similarly advance the 
debate beyond strictly Humean textual concerns to contemporary philosophical issues of 
history and historical method. Thus, from the arguments expounded in this essay, I would like 
to suggest that Hume’s historical method is in fact superior to many of its present day rivals, 
and even to the very theoreticians who criticise him. More precisely, Collingwood’s theory of 
historical re-enactment – just as the theories of Verstehen such as Dilthey’s – can now be seen 
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as more limited than Hume’s. For instance, none of them can account for agents’ failures or 
irrational choices.38 Hence, the difference between Hume and his successors seems to rely on 
the question of the limits of historical explanation: through the principle of sympathy and an 
extended generosity towards historical agents, the scope of the Humean historian is both 
wider and more charitable.  
 
Newnham College, University of Cambridge. 
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environment – see for instance Hume’s description of the process a reader of history experiences : he “enters 
deeper into the concerns of the persons; represents to himself their actions, and characters, and friendships and 
enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features, and air, and person” (Treatise, 98). This 
description no doubt fits the historian’s experience while writing narratives. Even though I can hypothetically 
sympathise with everyone, to sympathise with someone, something must make me participate in his situation. 
Literally, I must take part in his life, and for this reason, I remain at the level of concrete particularities. 
Therefore, far from being too general and abstract, Humean history is the history of the individuals with whom 
the historian sympathises.  
23 For Hume, the moral approval of an action is ultimately directed to a character or a quality of mind since they 
are the only legitimate objects of moral valuation. But since a spectator is only acquainted with actions, he infers 
the agent’s character from his actions.  
24 It would be interesting to compare Hume’s theory with Davidson’s. Davidson argues that interpreting an event 
as an action involves rationalising it, i.e. interpreting it in the light of the agent’s beliefs and desires. But as I will 
argue in the third section, Davidson’s principle of charity has a smaller scope than Hume’s theory of 
interpretation.  
25 Jones describes Hume’s account of aesthetic understanding in similar terms. See Jones (1999): 260-sq. 
26 J.Y.T. Greig [1931]: David Hume (London: Jonathan Cape), 268. 
27 By ‘rationality’, I mean that what people do makes sense for them. In this sense, I believe Hume’s concept of 
rationality exhibits a wider scope than its contemporary versions for it includes emotions, attitudes, passions and 
sentiments. 
28 The History of England, vol. V, chapter LII, 240. Cf. also “The world is still too young to fix many general 
truths in politics, which will remain true to the latest posterity. We have not as yet had experience of three 
thousand years; so that not only the art of reasoning is still defective in this science, as in all others, but we even 
want sufficient materials upon which we can reason” (Of Civil Liberty, 51). Hence, Hume is too aware of both 
his historically contingent condition and the youth of humanity to make such a trivial mistake.  
29 William Robertson [1769]: History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (London), II.67.  
30 The connection I suggest between Hume and the principle of charity was first inspired by the following 
passage of Hume’s History of England: “Sir George Ratcliffe, the earl’s intimate friend and confident, was 
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accused of high treason, sent for from Ireland, and committed to close custody. As no charge ever appeared or 
was prosecuted against him, it is impossible to give a more charitable interpretation of this measure, than that 
the commons thereby intended to deprive Strafford, in his present distress, of the assistance of his best friend” 
(The History of England, vol. V, chapter LIV, 310-311 ; my emphasis).  
31 A similar remark can be found in the writings of Adam Smith à propos the appropriateness of certain manners 
for a nation : “In general the style of manners which takes place in any nation may commonly upon the whole be 
said to be that which is most suitable to its situation. Hardiness is the character most suitable to the 
circumstances of a savage; sensibility to those of one who lives in a very civilised society” (The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, V.2.13, 209). 
32 A Dialogue, 334-335.  
33 Enquiry, 330.  
34 Our interpretation deliberately leaves out an issue that still needs to be tackled. Our argument seems to entail 
that Hume’s historical method implicitly contains a twofold theory of historical explanation. For instance, Hume 
writes: “What were the reasons, which engaged the king to admit such strange articles of peace, it is vain to 
enquire: For there scarcely could be any. The causes of that event may admit of a more easy explication” 
(History of England, vol. V, chapter LIII, 267). Thus, I have highlighted two distinct models of explanation: the 
‘covering law model’, which traces back the causes of actions through moral and causal reasoning, and the 
‘covering reason model’, which recovers the reasons behind actions by the means of sympathising with the 
agent. The former could be understood as the official Humean method (since it formulates general laws just as 
natural sciences), whereas the latter would be the genuine historical explanation (for it reaches the agent in his 
particular historical situation). Therefore, the remaining task is to coordinate these models within a theory of 
historical explanation.  
35 Agent’s reasons for acting are fundamentally aiming at some kind of good: “It appears, that there never was 
any quality recommended by any one […] but on account of its being useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to 
others” (A Dialogue, 335-336). Thus, when we trace back the causes of “Greek loves”, we reach “qualities 
esteemed in all nations and all ages” (A Dialogue, 334). For a detailed account, see D. W. Livingston [1984]: 
Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press), 187-sq. 
36 Thanks to Simon Blackburn for suggesting to me this expression.  
37 For Davidson has to accept that beliefs are true in order to understand their meaning – and we can only do this 
if we accept that what they say is largely true by our lights (cf. “Radical Interpretation” in D. Davidson [1984]: 
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press)).  
38 For an extended analysis of this point, see S. Blackburn [2001]: “Is Hume the Historian the Human 
Historian?” (personal communication) and S.K. Wertz [1994]: “Collingwood’s Understanding of Hume”, Hume 
Studies, vol. XX, pp. 261-287. 
